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CLEMENCY FOR KILLERS? PARDONING
BATTERED WOMEN WHO STRIKE BACK
I. INTRODUcTION
Brenda Aris met her husband, Rick Aris, when she was sixteen
years old, and he was in his mid-twenties.' They were married by the
time she was seventeen.2 Soon after they were married, Rick began
to abuse Brenda, and at one point broke both her jaw and her ribs
Brenda repeatedly attempted to leave her husband, but was always
drawn back by Rick's threats that he would kill either her or her
family.' It became harder and harder for Brenda to escape since the
family had no car and no telephone, and Brenda was rarely allowed
out of the house alone.5 In addition, Rick told Brenda that he would
kill her if she ever went to the police.6
The situation finally climaxed. During a four to six week period
Rick beat Brenda on a daily basis and threatened her life with a gun
or a knife at least four times a week.7 Whenever Rick left the house
he locked Brenda in her bedroom so she could not escape.8 One
summer night,9 after consuming large amounts of drugs and alcohol,
Rick beat Brenda severely and told her that "he didn't think he was
going to let [her] live until morning."'1 Convinced that he would kill
her when he woke up, Brenda waited until Rick passed out from the
combination of drugs and alcohol, and then shot him five times,
killing him immediately."
1. Courtroom, Code and Clemency: Reform in Self-Defense Jurisprudence for
Battered Women, Panel Discussion at Golden Gate University School of Law (Jan. 1993),
in 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 829, 842 (1993) [hereinafter Courtroom].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Virginia Ellis, Battered Wife Who Killed Husband Gets Early Release,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1994, at Al, A19.
10. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 842.
11. Id.; Ellis, supra note 9, at A19.
297
298 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:297
During Brenda's trial the jury was allowed to hear testimony
about the years of abuse Brenda suffered.'" In fact, members of
Rick's immediate family testified on Brenda's behalf as to the extent
and severity of the beatings. 3 Additionally, the trial court allowed
expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome,14 a psycholog-
ical theory that attempts to explain the actions of battered women
who kill so as to satisfy the requirements of a self-defense claim."
However, Brenda was not allowed a jury instruction on self-de-
fense. 6 As a result, there was no way the jury could have concluded
that Brenda's actions were legally justified. Several members of the
jury cried as they returned the verdict, 7 but Brenda was convicted
of second degree murder and sentenced to fifteen years to life."
Brenda Aris's case is an example of the failure of our criminal
justice system to adequately address the particular situation of
battered women who strike back at their abusers. Many battered
women are denied any sort of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome at their trial. 9 Even when expert testimony is allowed,
such as in Brenda Aris's case, the battered woman may still not be
allowed a self-defense instruction."0 Finally, when a battered woman
is allowed expert testimony on battered woman syndrome and a self-
defense instruction at her trial but is still convicted of homicide, there
are various reasons why society may want to take a second look at
12. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 842.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 843. The expert testimony was provided by Dr. Lenore E. Walker, a clinical
and forensic psychologist, who actually developed the theory of battered woman syndrome
and is widely recognized as its foremost authority. People v. Ads, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178,
1194, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (1989).
15. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: Battered
Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1579-80 (1993) [hereinafter
Developments]. However, the jury was not allowed to hear any testimony as to whether
Brenda herself was actually suffering from the syndrome. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 843.
In fact, the jury later stated that since they were not told that Brenda was suffering from
battered woman syndrome, they thought they were prohibited from concluding that she
did. d
16. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 843.
17. Id.
18. Ellis, supra note 9, at Al, A19.
19. Developments, supra note 15, at 1588. A recent study of 100 trials of battered
women found that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was offered in 44 cases
but admitted in only 26. Charles Patrick Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense: A Proposed
Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579, 585 (1990).
20. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 843; Developments, supra note 15, at 1584-85.
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her case to ensure that justice has been done.2' Executive clemency,
more commonly known as pardoning, presents a viable and essential
supplement to the often flawed substantive law methods of dealing
with such women.'
Pardoning is already used to remedy extreme sentences for some
battered women who kill.' However, the current structure of
executive clemency is flawed, largely because pardoning is exercised
at the whim of the executive, with political considerations often
outweighing concerns of justice.24 Until problems with the substan-
tive law treatment of battered women who kill are resolved, pardon-
ing is and should continue to be utilized.
This Comment argues that substantive law methods currently fail
to fully address the situation of battered women who kill their
abusers. In order to fill this gap, I propose that executive clemency
presents a viable and necessary approach, and should supplement
current substantive law to ensure that justice is done in every case.
This Comment concludes that battered women who have killed their
abusers may be particularly suited for the principled exercise of
executive clemency, as they often fulfill both its justice-enhancing
function and its justice-neutral function. Finally, this Comment
proposes changes in the procedural structure of the clemency process
that will work to ensure justice, particularly for battered women who
have killed.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME
AND EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
A. Substantive Law Methods of Dealing with
Battered Women Who Kill
Currently, most jurisdictions that use substantive law methods to
address specifically the problem of battered women who kill do so
21. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1591; see infra part III.A.
22. During May, 1993, California Governor Pete Wilson commuted Brenda Aris's
sentence from 15 years to life to 12 years to life, making her eligible for parole in less than
a year. Ellis, supra note 9, at Al, A19. Aris is the first woman in California who has
successfully earned executive clemency by arguing that she killed her abuser because she
was a battered woman. Id. at Al. Wilson commuted the sentence only after extensive
testimony by witnesses as to the abuse Brenda suffered, including testimony by Rick Aris's
own family. Id. at A19. For instance, Rick's own sister stated: "I loved my brother and
I always will, but I believe he was the meanest person I've ever known." Id.
23. Developments, supra note 15, at 1589-90.
24. Id. at 1590-91.
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through the admission of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome.' Battered woman syndrome is a psychological theory
that may enable the battered woman to claim self-defense as a
justification for her actions.26 This section presents a brief overview
of battered woman syndrome, its relevance to self-defense claims, and
the current state of the law as to admission of expert testimony
regarding the syndrome.
1. Battered woman syndrome
The effect of continuous physical or psychological abuse on many
women has come to be known as "battered woman syndrome." 7
Two of the main components of the syndrome have been described
as the "cycle theory of violence" and the "theory of learned helpless-
ness,"' which together assist in explaining the behavior of battered
women to juries and judges.29
The cycle theory of violence explains why many battered women
do not leave their abusers. This theory suggests that abuse often
occurs in a cyclical pattern.3" The first stage of abuse is described as
the "tension building" phase, during which abuse occurs in various
"mild" forms, such as pinching, slapping, or verbal and psychological
abuse.3' This phase may last up to ten years before progressing. 2
During this stage the woman often attempts to prevent the violence
from escalating and may even attempt to escape from the abuser.33
The second stage is termed the "acute battering" phase, during
which severe abuse occurs and tension climaxes.' This may last
25. Id. at 1575-78.
26. Id. at 1578. Before the mid-1970s battered women who killed their abusers usually
either pled guilty or claimed insanity, temporary insanity, or diminished capacity. Id. at
1577-78.
27. Id. at 1578; LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). The syndrome
has been defined as "a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are
abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant
male figure in their lives." State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (NJ. 1984).
28. WALKER, supra note 27, at 42-71.
29. Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 363, 368 (1992).
30. See LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATrERED WOMEN KILL
AND How SociETY RESPONDS 42 (1989) [hereinafter TERRIFYING LOVE]; Lenore E,
Walker et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982).
31. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 30, at 42.
32. WALKER, supra note 27, at 42, 58.
33. Id. at 56-60; TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 30, at 42-43.
34. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 30, at 43-44.
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from anywhere between two and twenty-four hours, and can be distin-
guished from the previous tension building stage in that the abuse is
far more violent and vicious.'
The final stage is the "contrition stage," during which the batterer
becomes loving and remorseful, and attempts to make up for the pain
he has caused." The abuser promises that the battering will never
occur again, and his behavior during this phase often brings back
pleasurable memories of better times for the battered woman.37
However, the cycle eventually renews itself as the tension again
builds up.3" The cyclical nature of the violence explains why many
battered women do not leave the abusive relationship; the period of
contrition keeps the woman emotionally attached and rekindles hope
that the relationship will return to its pre-battering contours.3 9
The second theory comprising battered woman syndrome is
termed learned helplessness.' ° Because the battered woman is often
subjected to "random, variable abuse with or without provocation,"41
she comes to believe that she has no control over the situation and
becomes passive, demoralized, and paralyzed, effectively unable to
leave the abusive relationship.4' In addition, "[b]ecause the battered
woman is unable to predict the effect her actions might have on her
battering spouse, she eventually learns that she has no control over
the situation or escape from the pain. Reacting with passivity
becomes her best defense."'43
35. Id. at 43. During this stage the battered woman may receive injuries such as
bruises, broken bones and internal injuries, and may also be raped. Andersen & Read-
Andersen, supra note 29, at 369.
36. TERRIFYING LovE, supra note 30, at 44-45.
37. Id.
38. Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 370-71.
39. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371-72.
40. WALKER, supra note 27, at 42-55. Courts have described learned helplessness in
various ways, such as "psychological torpor," Kelly, 478 A.2d at 386, and "a condition in
which the woman is psychologically locked into her situation due to economic dependence
on the man, an abiding attachment to him, and the failure of the legal system to
adequately respond to the problem." State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash. 1984).
41. Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 371.
42. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 30, at 37. Learned helplessness may be the result
of earlier abuse or socialization. Id. "The earlier a person falls into a pattern of learned
helplessness, the more difficult it is for that person to terminate a violent relationship."
Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 371 n.49.
43. Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 371 (footnote omitted).
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2. Why battered woman syndrome is relevant
to a claim of self-defense
Self-defense is the legal justification for the use of force in
response to an imminent threat of unlawful physical force.'
Generally, deadly force may be used only in response to a threat of
death or serious bodily harm.45 However, battered women are often
treated unequally when they make self-defense claims. 6 Two
reasons are generally suggested for such unequal treatment.
First, feminist scholars argue that there is an inherent gender bias
in the law of self-defense, rendering it unable to deal fairly with the
situation of battered women who kill their abusers.47 This inherent
bias in the law unfairly prevents battered women from presenting a
self-defense claim.'
Second, other scholars argue that it is not the law itself that is
biased, but rather the way the law is applied and interpreted. 9
Thus, bias against women prevents judges and juries from seeing
battered women's actions as reasonable."
Therefore, battered women who kill their abusers often have
difficulty making successful self-defense arguments due to bias in
either the law itself, or in its application. As a result of this bias,
battered women are often unable to convince the trier of fact that
they had a reasonable belief in the imminence of the danger and that
deadly force was necessary, both of which are required elements for
a successful self-defense claim.5  Expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome provides an explanation of the "reasonableness" of
44. "[Tjhe use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Official Draft 1985).
45. Id. § 3.04(2)(b). "The use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless the actor
believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury,
kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat." Id.
46. Developments, supra note 15, at 1575.
47. Id. Feminist scholars argue that battered women are often excluded from the two
"paradigms" in which the law imagines self-defense-the sudden attack by a stranger and
the dispute between two equals which gets out of hand. fia at 1576.
48. Id.
49. Id
50. Id.
51. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377.
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the battered woman's belief in both the imminence of danger and the
necessity of using deadly force. 2
In a majority of jurisdictions, the reasonable person standard is
a combination of objective and subjective analysis. 3 The trier of fact
must consider the reasonableness of the defendant's actions under the
circumstances, taking into account the defendant's experience and
perceptions. 4 Therefore, expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome is relevant to a claim of self-defense in that the trier of fact
must first understand the syndrome before it is possible to determine
whether a particular defendant was acting like a "reasonable"
battered woman.5
Battered women on trial for killing their abusers often require
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in order to
convince the trier of fact that they had a reasonable belief of
imminent danger. 6 For example, the batterer may be sleeping or
resting, yet still pose a threat of imminent danger to the battered
woman, perhaps because of her previous experience with the "subtle
gestures or threats that distinguish the severity of attacks."'
Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is also admitted
for the purpose of explaining the reasonableness of a battered
woman's belief that deadly force was required. 8 Often the trier of
fact refuses to believe that deadly force was justified when the
batterer is not using a weapon. 9 Expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome can convince the jury of the reasonableness of the
battered woman's belief that the threat of death or severe bodily
52. Developments, supra note 15, at 1580.
53. Id.
54. Id.; Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 409 & n.105 (1991).
55. Developments, supra note 15, at 1580. Professor Holly Maguigan argues that a
majority of jurisdictions use a combined objective/subjective reasonableness standard, even
though this is often obscured by an objective label. Maguigan, supra note 54, at 409-14.
Her survey of battered woman cases reveals that whether a jurisdiction labels its test a
"reasonable prudent battered woman" test, a "subjective" test, or a "combined subjective
and objective" test, the actual operation of the test differs very little. Id. at 409 n.106.
56. Developments, supra note 15, at 1582. For example, "although a sleeping or
resting batterer may not seem to pose a threat, [expert] testimony can establish that a
battered woman who kills her abuser in such situations may have reasonably believed that
she was in imminent danger." ld.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1581-82.
59. Id. at 1581.
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injury did indeed exist, regardless of whether a weapon was pres-
ent.60
A final purpose for which expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome is admitted pertains to the defendant's duty to retreat.
Generally, a defendant is not justified in using deadly force if the
necessity of using such force can be avoided with complete safety by
retreating.6' Therefore, expert testimony is relevant to prove the
reasonableness of the battered woman's belief that retreat could not
be made with complete safety.62
3. Admissibility of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
The current trend in most states is toward admitting expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome so long as it is relevant.63
Holly Maguigan, associate professor of law at New York University,
performed a survey of all published battered woman cases, and
discovered that
[t]he existing evidentiary law in every jurisdiction provides
that testimony about a defendant's history of abuse by the
decedent is admissible. Expert testimony regarding the
effects of a history of abuse, usually in the form of testimony
about the "battered woman syndrome," is admissible in the
overwhelming majority of the states .... In all but two of
these states, the testimony has been ruled admissible on the
basis of existing evidentiary provisions, without the necessity
of special legislation.'
However, in application, expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome is still excluded for various reasons, including that it does
60. Id. at 1582.
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
62. Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 378-79. But see Maguigan, supra
note 54, at 385-86 (arguing that expert testimony relating to the issue of the duty to retreat
is not necessary because "[o]nly a minority of jurisdictions impose a duty to retreat.., and
most of that minority exempt a person attacked in her home from the duty to retreat").
63. Developments, supra note 15, at 1582.
64. Maguigan, supra note 54, at 386 (footnotes omitted).
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not aid the jury,' it is irrelevant to the stated claim,' or it is
prejudicial.67
Although the admissibility of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome has remained a matter of judicial discretion in most
states, some legislative attempts to codify its admissibility have
succeeded.' Since 1990, nine states have passed legislation allowing
the use of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.69 For
example, a 1992 amendment to the California Penal Code provides
that expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome is scientifically
valid and should be admitted so long as it is relevant and witnesses
can demonstrate their qualifications.70
Additionally, one can argue that when expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome has been excluded at trial, the defendant
may appeal an unfavorable decision based upon the denial of her
constitutional right to present a defense.71 The right to present a
defense at a criminal trial, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment72 and the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, 73 requires admission of evidence critical to a fair
trial.74 Although this issue has not yet been decided, appellate
courts have stated in dicta that these constitutional provisions may
65. Developments, supra note 15, at 1583-84; see, e.g., Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374,
1378 (Wyo. 1981).
66. Developments, supra note 15, at 1584; see, e.g., People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196,
200 (I1. App. Ct. 1980) (barring expert testimony based on irrelevancy, immateriality, and
the fact that it would "serve no useful purpose").
67. Developments, supra note 15, at 1584; see, e.g., Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F. Supp.
1128, 1140 (E.D. Ohio 1990).
68. Developments, supra note 15, at 1585.
69. Id. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 43. States that
have passed such legislation include California, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, and Ohio.
Developments, supra note 15, at 1585 n.79.
70. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(b) (West Supp. 1995).
71. Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 363.
72. Id. at 385 n.143 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Webb
v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972)).
73. Id. at 385-86 (citing Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991); Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 409 (1988); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). In their article,
Andersen and Read-Andersen state that the right to present a defense is guaranteed by
the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment because, "the right to compel the
appearance of witnesses has meaning only if it includes the right to present the testimony
of these witnesses." Id. at 386.
74. Developments, supra note 15, at 1586 (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982); Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
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force the admission of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
in order to prove the material elements of self-defense.75
Finally, the use of battered woman syndrome has been extended
recently to cover a wide variety of situations where a battered woman
is not necessarily involved. Perhaps the term should be changed to
"battered person syndrome" because the admission of expert
testimony on the theory has been used to bolster self-defense claims
by battered males who killed their wives or lovers, 76 by gay men and
lesbians who killed their partners,' and by children who killed a
parent or parents. 78  In addition, expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome has been used by the defense in a homicide suit for
the murder of a woman by her husband!
79
B. Pardoning as a Current Procedural Method of Dealing with
Battered Women Who Kill
Executive clemency is a developing procedural alternative or
supplement to substantive law methods of dealing with battered
women who kill their abusers80 The most widely publicized exam-
ples of executive clemency for battered women who killed their
abusers include the granting of clemency to twenty-seven women by
former Ohio Governor Richard Celeste in December, 1990," and the
75. Id. at 1587.
76. See, e.g., State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
77. See generally Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered
Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive
Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993) (arguing for the use of expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome in trials of males and females who kill their abusive homosexual
lover).
78. See, e.g., State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 501-03 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
79. See Bettina Boxall, Abuse Expert Stirs Uproar With Simpson Defense Role, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at Al. Dr. Lenore Walker was scheduled to testify for the defense
in the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Id. Dr. Walker defended herself by saying
"[t]here's no question I'm an advocate for battered women. But I'm also a
scientist. Because I will advocate for battered women doesn't mean I will not
tell the truth about science .... I am not saying O.J. Simpson is not a batterer.
What I am saying is because you are a batterer that does not make you a
murderer."
Id. at A30. Dr. Walker's intent in testifying for the defense in this case is to "ensure that
the psychological data about domestic violence is not misrepresented by either side in the
case." Id
80. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. See generally Courtroom, supra
note 1 (discussing recent clemency movements).
81. E.g., Gibbs, supra note 69, at 44; Celeste Discusses Clemency Issue on Talk Show,
UPI, Dec. 26, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Celeste].
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pardoning of eight Maryland women by Governor William Donald
Schaefer in February, 1991.1 In order to understand more fully the
applicability of pardoning as a postconviction remedy for battered
women who kill their abusers, it is necessary to examine the history
and purposes of executive clemency within the United States.
1. What is executive clemency?
Clemency has been defined as "an official act by an executive
that removes all or some of the actual or possible punitive conse-
quences of a criminal conviction."'  While executive clemency
appeals do not affect a substantial portion of criminal cases,' 4 all the
constitutions in the world, except China's, provide for a pardoning
powerY In addition, in the United States the constitutions of forty-
eight of the fifty states also include some form of executive clemen-
cy.8
6
There are several different types of clemency.' This Comment
is concerned primarily with pardons and commutations. The
executive pardon can take many forms, as evidenced by the following
description:
[The pardon] can be a full pardon; fully pardoned offenders
simply walk away from jail as if they had never been tried
and sentenced. It can be partial, relieving the offender of
some but not all of the legal consequences of conviction. It
can be absolute, freeing the criminal without any conditions
whatever. Or it can be conditional, dependent on the
performance or nonperformance of acts specified by the
executive."
Commutation, on the other hand, is a more limited form of clemency,
which merely substitutes a lesser punishment for the one imposed by
82. E.g., Laura K. McFadden, A Matter of Murder and Survival, NEWSDAY (Nassau
and Suffolk Edition), Mar. 7, 1991, at 64.
83. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 4 (1989).
84. SAMUEL P. STAFFORD II, NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PUBLICATION No.
R0035, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE xvi (1977).
85. MOORE, supra note 83, at 7.
86. Id.
87. Other types of pardons include "amnesty," which is usually granted to a group of
people before a trial takes place and "reprieves," which merely postpone punishment for
a certain length of time. Id at 5.
88. Id.
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the court.8 9 Both pardons and commutations have been utilized in
granting clemency to battered women who have killed their abus-
ers.
0
2. A brief history of pardons in the United States
The inception of the executive pardoning power in the United
States was based largely on the English version of clemency.9' The
early colonists were apprehensive of an executive pardoning power
patterned after the royal pardoning power of the British monarchy.'
Thus, at the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787, few state
constitutions vested the pardoning power in the executive alone.93
However, despite this early distrust of vesting the pardoning power in
the executive, the 1787 draft of the U.S. Constitution did just that and
was agreed upon by the Framers after relatively little discussion. 4
Thus, Article II of the Constitution states that the President "shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."'95
In 1833 United States v. Wilson96 was the first Supreme Court
case to discuss the presidential pardoning power.' At this point the
Supreme Court looked toward British pardoning practices in order to
determine that pardons were acts of grace.98 Chief Justice John
Marshall defined a pardon as follows:
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate .. .
89. Id.; Daniel Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 577 (1991).
90. For example, former Ohio Governor Richard Celeste granted full pardons to 27
battered women who killed or assaulted their abusers. E.g., Celeste, supra note 81.
However, California Governor Pete Wilson chose instead to commute the sentences of two
battered women, which merely allowed a reduction in the amount of time served. E.g.,
Ellis, supra note 9, at A19.
91. Kobil, supra note 89, at 589.
92. MOORE, supra note 83, at 25.
93. Kobil, supra note 89, at 590.
94. MOORE, supra note 83, at 25.
95. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
96. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
97. Id. at 160; Kobil, supra note 89, at 594.
98. MOORE, supra note 83, at 50-51.
99. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 160.
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This definition of the pardon as a personal gift from a God-like
executive paved the way for the broad interpretation of the executive
clemency power that has persisted in the United States until today.
Although the Supreme Court later rejected the "act of grace" theory
of executive pardons for a public welfare centered theory,1" the
Court continues to interpret the President's pardoning power
broadly.10'
3. Current exercise of the executive pardon
Today the President's pardoning power is not limited in any
meaningful sense by either the legislative branch or the judicial
branch.'" In Ex parte Garland"0 3 the Supreme Court held that
"[t]his [pardoning] power of the President is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign preroga-
tive of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions.' ' "°
The judicial branch may have slightly more power to regulate the
exercise of the presidential pardon, as "courts have gradually
developed a bifurcated approach to evaluating exercises of clemency
that treats the President's reasons for using the power as sacrosanct,
but recognizes that courts may review and invalidate some pardons
because of their impermissible effect."10 5 Thus, although some cases
support the theory that the judiciary may review exercises of the
executive pardoning power for constitutional violations, the courts
have rarely used this power."
The executive pardoning power granted to governors through
state constitutions is roughly analogous to that of the President.
Generally, the states place full clemency authority in the hands of the
governor, with or without special clemency boards to provide
100. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480,486 (1927). In Biddle Justice Holmes wrote that
[a] pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening
to possess power. It is part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better
served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.
Id.
101. Kobil, supra note 89, at 594 (citing Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974)).
102. Id. at 595.
103. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
104. Id. at 380.
105. Kobil, supra note 89, at 598.
106. Id. at 601.
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recommendations." Except in a few states, there are generally no
statutory or administrative standards to guide the executive in the use
of the pardoning power. 8
Thus, the clemency power in both the federal and state govern-
ments is vested largely in the executive branch and is not significantly
limited by the other coequal branches of government. The above-
described procedural context of executive clemency largely defines its
use and underlying rationales.
4. The use of the executive clemency power
The use of the presidential clemency power in the United States
has declined precipitously in the last twenty years."° This decline
has been traced to various causes, including changing trends in the
philosophical purposes for punishment during the last century"' and
a "lack of consistent, principled standards governing [its] exer-
cise..' Thus, pardoning has played a minimal role in the presiden-
tial experience for at least the last five administrations, with the
possible exception of President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon."'
However, the pardoning power has played a more significant role
for the political lives of state governors."' For instance, one
governor has been removed from office and another indicted for
107. As of 1977, 31 states gave the governor full clemency power, 10 states gave
clemency power to special pardoning boards, seven states provided that the governor may
grant clemency only after recommendation by the pardoning board, and two states had
original systems vesting the pardoning power in the governor with some limitations.
STAFFORD, supra note 84, at 1.
108. Kobil, supra note 89, at 605. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West Supp.
1995), which states that the Board of Prison Terms may report to the Governor those
prisoners who "ought to have a commutation of sentence or be pardoned and set at liberty
on account of good conduct, or unusual term of sentence, or any other cause, including
evidence of battered woman syndrome, which, in its opinion, should entitle the prisoner
to a pardon or commutation of sentence." Thus, California does present some guidance
to the executive and even singles out battered women as particularly eligible for pardons.
109. See MOORE, supra note 83, at 82-84; Kobil, supra note 89, at 602.
110. MOORE, supra note 83, at 83-84. Moore posits that the decline in pardons can be
traced to the shifting focus of the criminal justice system this century-first on the
rehabilitative purposes for punishment, then moving towards retributive justifications. Id.
She argues that the rehabilitative focus eliminated the need for pardons through
indeterminate sentencing and parole. Id. at 83. Subsequently, the shift back to retributive
principles of justice has fostered public criticism of any type of leniency towards criminals.
Id. at 84.
111. Kobil, supra note 89, at 602.
112. Id. at 603 & n.221.
113. Id. at 607.
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improprieties committed while in office, based upon alleged abuse of
the pardoning power."4 Additionally, the particular exercise of the
pardoning power by certain governors has seriously affected their
political careers.'
As criminal law was not designed with the particular situation of
battered women in mind, judicial discretion and flexible sentencing
have played important roles in ensuring that they were treated
justly."6 However, the trend in today's criminal justice system
toward inflexible sentencing guidelines and stricter enforcement of
criminal sentences creates an increasing necessity for clemency in
order to ensure that battered women are treated fairly by the criminal
justice system."7 It is against this backdrop of the current state of
pardoning in the United States that battered women who have killed
their abusers are considered for clemency today.
III. PARDONING BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL
A. The Failure of Substantive Law to Fully Deal with
Battered Women Who Have Killed Their Abusers
Domestic abuse is a widespread problem in our culture, with
researchers estimating that between 1.6 and 4 million women suffer
abuse by their husbands or boyfriends each year."' Although a
majority of states currently allow the admission of expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome in cases of battered women who have
killed their abusers, either through judicial discretion or statutory
enactments, 1 9 many women are convicted of first or second degree
murder even with such expert testimony.'2 Aside from various
substantive critiques of battered woman syndrome itself and its use in
114. Id. Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton was impeached in 1923 for selling pardons.
Id. Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton was indicted for conspiring to take kickbacks for
liquor store licenses following a scandal involving the sale of pardons in the early 1980s.
Id.
115. Id. Kobil discusses the effect various pardons have had on the political success of
various governors, from an Illinois governor in 1893 to former California Governor Pat
Brown. Id. at 606-11.
116. See id. at 611-12 (discussing the trend toward removing flexibility and discretion
in sentencing).
117. Id. at 611.
118. Andersen & Read-Andersen, supra note 29, at 366 & n.15.
119. See supra part II.A.3.
120. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 833; Ewing, supra note 19, at 580; see also Maguigan,
supra note 54, at 432 (demonstrating that battered women have a higher reversal rate on
appeal, which suggests they are sometimes deprived of fair treatment at their trials).
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the courtroom, 21 many battered women currently serving long
prison terms were convicted before expert testimony was admissible,
while others were convicted in spite of such testimony being admitted
at their trial.'22
1. Justification for specially tailored treatment of
battered women who kill
While there is no unanimous agreement that battered women
who kill are, or should be, legally justified in their actions,123 one
must admit that such women are in a different position with relation
to justice than are other classes of homicide defendants. 24 The fact
that a woman was battered, and the extent and duration of such
abuse, is so relevant that it demands that such a woman receive some
sort of specially tailored treatment from the criminal justice sys-
tem."z  The admission of battered woman testimony itself is one
such specifically tailored treatment that demonstrates "an underlying
discomfort with not treating battered women who kill in a manner
different from other homicide defendants.,
126
The justifications for tailored treatment of battered women who
kill include the fault of society itself in the creation of the problem of
battered women 127 and the historic discrimination against women
claiming self-defense in the criminal justice system.28 Of course,
121. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 54 (arguing that the present state of substantive law
is more than adequate for dealing with battered women who kill); Mira Mihajlovich, Does
Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-
Defense, 62 IND. LJ. 1253 (1987) (arguing that expert testimony should not be used in
battered woman trials because of danger to the judicial system and society in general);
Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71
N.C. L. REV. 371 (1993) (arguing for elimination of the imminence requirement from
successful self-defense claims in certain cases).
122. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 833.
123. See infra part III.B.3.
124. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1591.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Societal negligence for the problem of battered women who kill is often based on
the failure of law enforcement or governmental agencies to protect battered women. See
Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of
Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 227,233 (1986).
128. According to Michael Dowd, director of the Pace University Battered Women's
Justice Center, the average sentence for a woman who kills her intimate partner is 15 to
20 years, while the average sentence for a man who does the same is two to six years.
Gibbs, supra note 69, at 42. Many believe that battered women's claims are routinely
treated unfairly by the criminal justice system, leading to disproportionately unfavorable
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while not all battered women act in self-defense when they kill their
abusers, a substantially higher reversal rate on appeal is an additional
indicator that they are often deprived of a fair trial.29 Advocates
for battered women are not asking for leniency or a lowered standard,
but rather for equal treatment under the law, which can only be
achieved through specialized treatment. 3 While substantive law
methods attempt to address this need for a specialized, tailored
treatment, there are many flaws with current methods that can
actually work against the women they purport to help or exclude
various classes of women from just treatment.
2. The law itself-criticism of admission of expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome
a. the creation of negative stereotypes of women
Attacks upon the admission of expert testimony in the trials of
battered women who kill their abusers have focused recently upon the
negative stereotypes of women that the syndrome perpetuates.13'
It has been argued that the syndrome reinforces and perpetuates
stereotypical views of women as irrational and helpless. "The more
the existing social reality of inequality is reflected in the law-the
more accurate the rule-the more the inequality is reinforced.,
132
The concept of learned helplessness has been specifically attacked
as portraying women as passive, vulnerable victims, requiring a
different and more lenient set of laws.133 The present system of
excusing battered women who kill their abusers has been denounced
as "incapable of accommodating women's experiences without judging
results in comparison with the treatment of male criminals. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE,
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW xiii (1989);
see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law
of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 636 (1980) (arguing that as a result of
sex-based bias and stereotypes, judges are less likely to excuse a woman under a self-
defense claim than under a claim of incapacity).
129. Developments, supra note 15, at 1591.
130. Id.
131. E.g., Laura E. Reece, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S
Li. 53 (1991).
132. Id. at 53.
133. Id. at 53-55.
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women to be deviant from and inferior to the model human ac-
tor. ' m
b. problems with statutes
Nine states have passed specific laws allowing expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome in cases where the battered woman kills
her spouse or lover.13 However, in most jurisdictions the question
remains an issue for judicial discretion.'36 While these developments
appear to represent an advance toward equitable treatment for
battered women who kill their abusers, there are many problems with
the codification of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.
First, statutes allowing expert testimony often sharply restrict
such testimony to battered woman syndrome itself and exclude any
testimony on the experiences of domestic violence victims."7 This
narrow construction of expert testimony serves to exclude the
experiences of battered women who do not fit the "paradigmatic
battered woman"'38 or "good battered woman" stereotypes.
139
Second, there is a tendency among legislators to assume that once
such a statute is enacted into law, the problem of battered women
who kill their abusers has been fully addressed. 40 Legislators often
assume that once expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is
statutorily allowed at trial, deserving victims will be acquitted. 4'
134. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994). In this article
Coughlin argues that the only way to address this problem is to revise the theory of
responsibility presently endorsed by the criminal law system to "include characteristics
traditionally associated with and internalized by women." Id. But see Maguigan, supra
note 54 (arguing that the current system is fully capable of embracing the problem of
battered women who kill).
135. Gibbs, supra note 69, at 43.
136. Id.
137. See Courtroom, supra note 1, at 832-33. For example, California enacted § 1107
of the California Evidence Code on January 1, 1992. This law allows expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome in a criminal action. CAL EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp.
1995). However, the statute excludes some of the original language of Assembly Bill 2613,
which did not mention battered woman syndrome per se, but allowed expert testimony on
the "nature and effect of physical, sexual and emotional abuse on the behavior, beliefs or
perceptions of persons in a domestic relationship including descriptions of the experiences
of battered women." Courtroom, supra note 1, at 832. Additionally, an attempt was made
to amend the statute to allow evidence of "the experiences of victims of domestic
violence," but this attempt was unsuccessful. Id
138. See infra part III.A.3.a.
139. See supra part II.A.3; infra part III.A.3.b.
140. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 832.
141. Id.
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However, this is often not the case, as many battered women are
convicted even when expert testimony is admitted during their
trial.
142
Thus, the passage of statutes allowing expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome in the trials of battered women who kill
their abusers is a double-edged sword. The admission of such
testimony may limit the expert testimony in a manner that may serve
to exclude many battered women from its embrace. 43 Additionally,
these statutes codify a presentation of women as helpless, pathologi-
cal, and passive, under the guise of favoring them. 44 While many
of these statutes are beneficial to battered women, the fact remains
that, at best, they do not entirely solve the problem of battered
women and, at worst, they may actually harm those women whom
they purport to help.
These arguments regarding the effectiveness of admitting expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome and the wider social results
of such testimony often advocate a variety of reforms to deal with
flaws in the present system. Such reforms range from a complete
abandonment of any differential treatment of battered women in
substantive law145 to the reorganization of the basic theory of
responsibility that composes our criminal justice system.
146
While it is hoped that substantive reforms will reduce the number
of battered women erroneously convicted for the killing of their
abusers, this Comment addresses the problem of women who are not,
for various reasons, adequately and fairly served by substantive law.
While a substantive legal theory that effectively deals with every
battered woman who kills her abuser is ideal, clemency must be
utilized as a viable and necessary remedy until that ideal is reached.
142. Id. at 833. Of course, not every battered woman who kills is entitled to an
acquittal. However, the large number of battered women who are denied fair trials
suggest the probability of erroneous convictions in at least some cases. See Maguigan,
supra note 54, at 386-87; infra part III.B.2.a.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
144. See supra part III.A.1.
145. E.g., Mihajlovich, supra note 121, at 1253-54.
146. E.g., Coughlin, supra note 134, at 1.
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3. Application of the law-criticism of the misuse of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
by judges, attorneys, and juries
There are various reasons why certain classes of battered women
who kill their abusers "slip through the cracks" of the present
substantive criminal justice system. Battered women who do not fit
perfectly into the stereotype of the "battered woman" may be denied
fair treatment. In addition, battered women who belong to certain
classes often do not receive fair treatment at trial, or at least
treatment equivalent to that of other battered women who kill their
abusers, because of prejudice or discrimination.'47 Thus, clemency
presents a necessary alternative that should be utilized in order to
ensure just treatment for such women.
a. the "paradigmatic battered woman"
The increasing use of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome to address the problem of battered women who kill has
actually resulted in some women being harmed and their legal options
restricted." The intense focus on battered woman syndrome has
created a "paradigmatic battered woman" who embodies all of the
characteristics typically associated with battered women. 49 Charac-
teristics of the stereotypical battered women include never previously
fighting back, never attempting to leave the batterer, and never
calling the police or notifying other authorities.' 0 Of course, it is
practically impossible for any one battered woman to fit perfectly into
the stereotype of a battered woman, but courts have created a
"rigidly-defined and narrowly-applied definition,"'' excluding many
women who may suffer from the syndrome. "Some courts seem to
treat battered woman syndrome as a standard to which all battered
women must conform rather than as evidence that illuminates the
147. See supra part II.A.3.
148. Developments, supra note 15, at 1593.
149. Id.
150. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill
Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 121, 148-50 (1985); see, e.g., Mullis v. State,
282 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ga. 1981) (excluding expert testimony in a case where the battered
woman routinely fought back against her abuser); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 310
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (excluding expert testimony because the battered woman and her
abuser were not married at trial court but reversed at appellate court).
151. Crocker, supra note 150, at 144.
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defendant's behavior and perceptions.""15 Women who do not fit
into the exact stereotype of a battered woman may not receive expert
testimony or a jury instruction on self-defense at trial.53
Courts may restrict the use of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome to those women who fit the strict paradigm of the
battered woman. 54 This restriction can create a catch-22 for some
battered women. 55 For example,
[i]f the defendant has tried to resist in the past, the court
accepts this as evidence that rebuts her status as a battered
woman. On the other hand, if the defendant has never
attempted to fight back, the prosecution argues that the
defendant did not act as a "reasonable man."
156
In addition, courts may define battered woman so strictly that
near irrelevant characteristics may exclude certain battered women
from the definition, denying them expert testimony, a self-defense
claim, or both. One characteristic that prosecutors may utilize to
exclude a battered woman from fitting into the paradigmatic battered
woman stereotype is the economic status of the woman. 57
Joyce Steiner's case provides an example of a woman's economic
status being used as a stereotype. Joyce was seriously abused by her
husband for many years before she finally shot him, but at her trial
the prosecution emphasized that she was a successful business
manager who "surely would not have tolerated years of abuse."1 8
However, battered woman syndrome "'is something that happens to
even a middle-class person,. . . you don't have to be poor or illiterate
to get the crap beat out of you.' 1
59
Courts have also emphasized factors such as the battered
woman's knowledge and previous use of guns in order to exclude
152. Id.
153. Developments, supra note 15, at 1593.
154. See supra note 150.
155. Crocker, supra note 150, at 144-50.
156. Id. at 145.
157. See McFadden, supra note 82, at 64 (prosecution emphasizing battered woman's
professional status).
158. Id. Prosecutors argue that economic status is relevant to whether a woman fits the
battered woman paradigm because it can show why the woman was unable to leave the
abuser. See id. However, this argument ignores the fact that women in higher economic
classes may be just as unable to leave their husbands due either to threats or the feeling
that the abuse is all their fault. See id. "Women with absorbing, successful jobs are
especially vulnerable to feeling they are failures if their marriages don't work out." Id.
159. Id. (quoting Joyce Steiner).
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certain women from the battered woman paradigm. If a woman can
use a gun competently, then she cannot possibly be a "helpless"
battered woman, but if she uses the gun "like a woman," in that she
is unable to aim or takes more than one shot, then she fits the
paradigm."6  Such adherence to outward manifestations of the
paradigmatic battered woman obscures the fact that the underlying
focus should be on the particular situation of the battered woman
herself,
161
The consequences of the judicial creation of a paradigmatic
woman can be dire.
The result is that the claims of the individual woman get
caught between two conflicting stereotypes: the judicial
construct of the battered woman based on the syndrome
testimony, and the prosecutorial model that uses myths
about battered women to prove their unreasonableness.
Neither of these stereotypes allows a battered woman to
portray the reasonableness of her actions accurately to the
jury.
162
Of course, just because a woman was battered does not mean she is
entitled to a self-defense claim, but "circumstances at variance with
the traditional paradigm" should not be conclusive evidence that the
battered woman did not have a reasonable fear of imminent
harm. 63 However, because many judges have construed battered
woman syndrome in this manner, women have been unfairly
convicted."6
The creation of this paradigmatic battered woman in the minds
of the legal system serves to exclude certain battered women who do
not fit the paradigm from meaningful treatment by the criminal justice
system. 65 Until the battered woman paradigm is destroyed, such
battered women have a particular need for clemency.
160. Crocker, supra note 150, at 145 n.106; see, e.g., Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 679
(Ga. 1981) (noting that battered woman testimony should have been admitted in situation
where defendant shot with eyes closed and failed to aim carefully); Commonwealth v.
Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Mass. 1975) (noting that battered woman's prior knowledge
of guns and the fact that the killing took only one shot helped convict her).
161. Crocker, supra note 150, at 144-50.
162. Id. at 144.
163. Developments, supra note 15, at 1593-94.
164. Crocker, supra note 150, at 144-50.
165. See id.; Developments, supra note 15, at 1593-94.
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b. the "good battered woman" theory
Similar to the paradigmatic battered woman, the "good battered
woman" theory focuses on the misuse of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome due to prejudice."6 However, this theory encom-
passes prejudice not only against women in general, but also
particular prejudice against certain classes of women based on
characteristics such as race. 67
The very characteristics that make up the conception of battered
woman syndrome-weakness, passivity, and fearfulness-can also be
said to be those associated with the stereotype of the "good"
woman.'" The good woman stereotype is based on the historic
stereotype of the ideal woman-that is, a passive, heterosexual,
helpless, white woman.' 69 Correspondingly, women who do not fit
the stereotype of the good woman may not fit the stereotype of the
battered woman.
For example, black women have long been stereotyped as the
"bad" woman, and thus as not conforming with the stereotype of the
good battered woman.70 As a result, black women are less likely
to benefit from admission of testimony on battered woman syn-
drome.17 ' The following explanation describes this process:
Race certainly plays a major role in the cultural distinction
between the "good" and "bad" woman. The passive, gentle
white woman is automatically more like the "good" fairy tale
princess stereotype than a Black woman, who as the "other"
may be seen as the "bad" witch . ... If a woman is per-
ceived as being a "good" woman, she can expect greater
protection, while Black women are seen as "bad" and as
deserving victims.'72
166. See Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black
Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1991).
167. Id. at 194. The good woman and the bad woman stereotypes were developed by
feminist scholars in the context of gender stereotypes. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN,
WOMAN HATING 48-49 (1974). These stereotypes pervade our society, and thus play a
role in the use of battered woman syndrome in the criminal justice arena. Id.
168. See id. at 23, 42, 48.
169. Id.
170. See Allard, supra note 166, at 193-94.
171. Id. at 193-94, 200-05.
172. Id. at 194.
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In addition to the perception of black women as bad women, thus
not deserving of any special treatment, black women may not fit into
the stereotype of a battered woman due to society's perception of
them as possessing certain characteristics absent from the white
woman model. For example, some of the stereotypical perceptions of
black women in our society that may serve to exclude them from the
traditional battered woman stereotype include being domineering,
assertive, hostile, strong, matriarchal, and emasculating.
171
Thus, the particular situation of women of color, especially black
women, may not be adequately addressed by the substantive law
regarding battered women who kill their abusers. This inadequacy
serves to heighten the importance of clemency in dealing with
battered women, as its use may serve to remedy some of the gaps in
substantive law.
B. Battered Women Who Kill Are Particularly Suited for the
Exercise of Executive Clemency
This section sets forth a principled basis for the application of
executive clemency to battered women who have killed. Once this
Comment establishes that battered women are often particularly
qualified for clemency or a pardon, it will go on to propose a
procedural structure through which such pardoning can be exer-
cised.' 74
1. Principled rationales for the exercise of the pardoning power
Various rationales have been postulated for the use of the
pardoning power, depending in large part upon the prevailing view of
the purposes of punishment. These rationales represent principled
alternatives to the exercise of clemency merely at the executive's
whim or as a discretionary act of grace, two rationales that have
apparently prevailed throughout American history. 75 In order to
ensure that battered women receive pardons when, and only when,
they are justified, a principled structure must be developed through
which executives may exercise their power. This section attempts to
lay out such a structure.
173. Id. at 203-05.
174. See infra part III.C.
175. See supra part II.B.2.
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a. retributive theory of punishment and pardoning
A retributive theory of punishment asserts that people should get
what they deserve.'76 Translating the retributive theory of punish-
ment to the pardoning arena is simply to state that since punishment
is justified only when it is deserved, so should pardons be granted
only when they are deserved.
77
Based upon the retributive theory of punishment, the basic
justifications for pardoning can be stated as follows:
[P]ardons are required when a convicted person is not liable
to punishment on retributivist grounds; ... pardons are
justifiable when a convicted person is liable to punishment,
but not morally deserving of punishment; and ... pardons
are unjustifiable when a convicted person is both liable to
punishment and morally deserving.
1 78
Under this analysis questions of mercy and pity are irrelevant to
the exercise of the pardoning power.17 1 Other improper uses of the
pardoning power include pardons for the public welfare,80 pardons
to promote the private welfare of the pardoner, 8' pardons to
reward past action," 2 and pardons based on the respectability of the
criminal's family. 3
Therefore, under a retributivist theory of pardon, all persons
should get their just deserts. Any pardon that is not based solely on
what that person deserves is improper and thus should not be granted.
176. MOORE, supra note 83, at 10-11. Moore's theory of retributive justice is a
combination of "legalistic" retributivism and "moralistic" retributivism. Id. at 11.
Legalistic retributivists state that punishment is justified based on the act committed, while
moralistic retributivists argue that punishment is justified based upon the moral character
of the person committing the act. Id.
177. Id. at 89.
178. Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 205-07.
180. Id. at 199. Some examples of pardons for the public good include pardons to quell
insurrections, the pardons of Confederate soldiers following the Civil War, and perhaps
even pardons increasing the popularity of the ruler. Id at 199-202.
181. Id. at 202.
182. Id. at 204-05. The basis for this argument is that the pardon is not properly
utilized as a reward, but only for giving people what they deserve as a result of their
criminal actions. Id. Therefore, acts benefiting the state that a convicted person performs
while in jail or before they were convicted should not constitute a legitimate basis for
pardon under the retributivist theory. Id.
183. Id. at 209.
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b. criticism of a purely retributive theory of pardoning
There are several criticisms of a purely retributivist theory of
pardon. However, the purely retributivist theory of pardon, which
asks only that justice be served, with no mercy and pity, has tradition-
ally been one of the primary considerations used by executives in
determining whether or not to pardon184
One objection to the retributive theory of pardoning is that it
"dehumanizes the one last American institution with any heart, the
only institution that can cut through harsh and unbending rules,
responding to pain with a simple act of kindness, human being to
human being."' 85 Such criticism recognizes the human element that
pervades concepts of punishment, a recognition that is particularly on
point in the case of battered women who kill.
A second criticism of the retributivist theory is that it is not
always possible to determine what exactly are the just deserts for a
particular crime.'86 Reasonable people may differ as to what
constitutes moral blameworthiness, and even perhaps as to what
constitutes legal blameworthiness. However, our criminal justice
system does seem to presume that "it is possible to establish the
particular punishment deserved by each offender based on the nature
of [the] crime."'" Therefore, since we largely base the dispensation
of punishment on retributivist principles, it is reasonable to also base
the remission of punishment on such principles.""
One final problem with a purely retributivist approach to
pardoning is found in the very nature of the approach itself: It is
purely retributivist. In reality, societal concerns other than retribution
play a role in our criminal justice system, including the principles of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.'89 Our society has
184. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 281, 283, 285 (1993).
185. MOORE, supra note 83, at 227.
186. Kobil, supra note 89, at 579-80; see also Hugo A. Bedau, Retribution and the
Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 608-11 (1978) (stating the impossibility of
determining either what "desert" means or the particular level of punishment deserved for
certain acts); Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 973, 1013-15 (1985) (stating even proponents of retributivist pardoning are unable
to match offenses with the appropriate punishments).
187. Kobil, supra note 89, at 580.
188. Id.
189. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 5-7 (1987). For example,
a criminal may have already completed a punishment that society has determined to be
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based its system of punishment on a combination of rationales; thus,
the remission of punishment also should be based upon some
amalgamation of retributivist and other concerns, with "deserts
provid[ing] only a starting point, [and] utilitarian and other societal
concerns establishing secondary limits on the remission of punishment
generally, and in individual cases." 1"
Because of the importance of the retributivist theory of justice in
our criminal justice system and without ignoring the other societal
concerns that also play an important role, the best approach to
pardoning would be one that combines all of these concerns.
c., the justice-enhancing and justice-neutral approach to pardoning
A division of the exercise of the pardoning power into its justice-
neutral and justice-enhancing goals will serve battered women by
removing many of the pressures that cause the clemency power to be
exercised randomly or subjected to political whim.191 All uses of the
pardoning power may be divided into justice-enhancing uses and
justice-neutral uses."9 Daniel Kobil, assistant professor of law at
Capital University Law School, bases this theory on the view that the
criminal justice system may be understood only through the combina-
tion of a retributivist view of justice with utilitarian and other social
concerns. 93 Justice-enhancing uses of the pardoning power are
those that satisfy the retributive goal of matching up each criminal
with their just deserts,194 while justice-neutral goals' are those
unrelated to the individual offender but concerned more with societal
issues and welfare considerations.195
Justice-enhancing uses of the pardoning power encompass the
various rationales for pardoning laid out under the retributivist theory
"what he deserves," according to retributivist goals of justice, yet society may decide not
to release that criminal for various reasons. It may be determined that the criminal needs
to be punished more for the purpose of deterring others from committing the same crime,
that the criminal should be incapacitated so he or she cannot commit the same crime
again, or that principles of rehabilitation demand that the criminal remain in prison.
190. Kobil, supra note 89, at 581; see also Gale, supra note 186, at 1005-11 (stating that
utilitarian and retributive goals often conflict).
191. See infra part III.C.1.
192. See Kobil, supra note 89, at 579, 582-83.
193. Id. at 581.
194. Id. at 579.
195. Id. at 613-14.
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of pardoning.'96 The concepts of pardoning to satisfy retributive
goals of criminal justice and justice-enhancing uses of clemency are
the same. Accordingly, the main categories of retributivist pardoning
are labeled as follows in this Comment in order to demonstrate when
pardoning is proper for justice-enhancing purposes.
The first area in which pardoning is justified by retributivist
principles is factual or legal innocence,"9 or substantial doubt of
guilt.98 The second area is technical guilt with mitigating circum-
stances, such as mental impairment or persons whose age or health
warrant a reduced sentence.' The third category in which clemen-
cy should be exercised is technical guilt with moral innocence.2
The final category is pardoning to remedy disparities in punishment
or sentencing unrelated to deserts.2"' Each of these areas represents
distinct situations where pardoning would be justified under
retributivist principles.
Justice-neutral uses of the pardoning power have been used
throughout history to further utilitarian goals.2" Today we would
view these justice-neutral uses of the pardoning power as flagrant
abuses. For example, the executive often used the pardoning power
to further personal political goals, such as enhancing his own wealth
or power.20 3 However, justice-neutral uses of the pardoning power
can still play a valuable role when they are justified by public welfare
considerations.
204
196. Although various different subdivisions of justice-enhancing uses of the pardoning
power may be found, they generally seem to apply different labels to the same categories
of cases. See generally MOORE, supra note 83, at 11 (positing innocence, excusable crime,
justified crime, and adjustments to sentences as justifications for pardons); STAFFORD,
supra note 84, at xvi (citing frequently used grounds for granting clemency); Kobil, supra
note 89, at 624-33 (proposing seven different categories where pardoning should be
granted under a justice-enhancing method).
197. See Courtroom, supra note 1, at 837-38.
198. Kobil, supra note 89, at 624.
199. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 837-38.
200. Id. at 838-39.
201. Kobil, supra note 89, at 627-30.
202. Id. at 582-83.
203. Id. at 588, 592-93.
204. Id. at 613-14. For example, the pardoning of Confederate soldiers following the
war may have been justified in that it promoted the harmony necessary to reunite the
nation. MOORE, supra note 83, at 201-02.
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2. Battered women often satisfy the justice-enhancing
goals of pardoning
In order to satisfy the justice-enhancing goals of pardoning, a
battered woman who has killed her abuser must fit into one of the
four categories outlined above: factual/legal innocence, technical guilt
with significant mitigating factors, technical guilt with moral inno-
cence, or disparities in punishment and sentencing. 5 Many bat-
tered women who are convicted of homicide fit into one of these four
categories, and thus deserve a pardon according to the justice-
enhancing goals of pardoning.'
a. factual/legal innocence or substantial doubt of guilt
Several categories of battered women who have killed their
abusers fit the classification of factual or legal innocence. Factual
innocence represents the rare case where the battered woman in
question did not actually commit the actus reus, °7 but rather
somebody else did. Legal innocence, however, covers the more
common situation wherein the battered woman was legally justified
in committing the act of killing. Furthermore, in situations where
innocence is not positive, there may still be substantial doubt of guilt,
which may also justify executive clemency.2
The main category of battered women who fit this classification
includes those who were unjustly convicted because they did not
receive a fair trial for various reasons?' This category can be
subdivided into two areas: those women who were denied a proper
jury instruction on self-defense and those women who were denied a
205. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
206. Of course, battered women are not the only convicted persons who would be
entitled to executive clemency under the categories set out below. See generally Kobil,
supra note 89, at 624-33 (providing a general discussion of the types of persons entitled to
pardons based on the justice-enhancing theory of clemency).
207. An actus reus is the physical act which, when combined with intent, renders an
actor criminally liable. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990).
208. Kobil, supra note 89, at 624. Substantial doubt of guilt "may be the result of new
evidence, information suppressed at trial or withheld by the prosecution, incompetence of
defense counsel, coercion of a guilty plea, or any other reason that seriously undermines
.. confidence in the integrity of the judicial determination." Id. at 624-25.
209. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 840. Of course, the fact that the main category of
battered women who are factually innocent are those who did not receive a fair trial does
not exclude the possibility that there are some women in prison who did not even commit
the act of killing.
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fair trial due to the exclusion of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome 1
Before the admission of expert testimony became widespread in
the mid-1970s, many battered women who killed their abusers were
unable to claim self-defense due to the narrow judicial interpretation
of the defense.2 Many battered women were forced to plead
insanity, temporary insanity, or diminished capacity because no jury
would find a woman's actions in murdering her husband "reason-
able., 21 2  In fact, defense attorneys used to plead one of these
diminished capacity defenses almost every time a woman committed
a homicide, no matter what the situation. 3 In addition, defense
lawyers would "routinely" plead women to a lesser charge, believing
that, due to negative stereotypes of women, a jury would never find
that the reasonableness requirement of a self-defense claim was
satisfied.2t4
It is likely that jury instructions on self-defense were unfairly
denied to many battered women due to misapplication of the law of
self-defense by the trial court because of negative stereotypes about
women. 15  Battered women who kill continue to be denied jury
instructions on self-defense because the judge believes that one of the
components of the claim is not present when the woman kills in a
"nonconfrontational" situation.1 6 Because these women were
denied the opportunity to establish their self-defense claim, it is likely
that they did not receive a fair trial, and thus were unjustly convicted
and are proper subjects for the exercise of the pardoning power.
In addition, bias against female defendants by the judge and/or
jurors may also have wrongly convicted battered women, if expert
210. Id. at 839-40.
211. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1577-78. Even when a claim of self-defense
could be raised, it was considered bad strategy to do so in the case of battered women
because the consensus was that no juror would find that the battered women met the
reasonableness requirement of the self-defense claim. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 840.
212. Developments, supra note 15, at 1577-78.
213. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend
Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 159
(1978).
214. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 840.
215. See Maguigan, supra note 54, at 384 (stating that 70% to 90% of battered women
who kill do so when faced with either an ongoing attack or the imminent threat of death
or serious bodily harm).
216. See, e.g., People v. Axis, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989).
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testimony on battered woman syndrome- was not allowed at trial.217
Before the admission of expert testimony on the psychological effects
of battering, juries were often unable to understand battered women's
actions.2 18 For example, jurors commonly can not comprehend why
battered women stay in abusive relationships, do not report the
previous abuse if it really happened, and perceive the threat of death
or severe bodily harm as being imminent21 9
The increasing prevalence of statutes allowing the admission of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome has helped to ensure
that jury misunderstanding and bias do not create an unfair trial."2
However, studies show that the admission of such expert testimony is
still denied in many cases.22 The admission of expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome evens the playing field to some degree by
granting jurors some insight into the experiences and psychological
condition of battered women, since "the use of expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome bolsters a traditional self-defense claim
by countering potential judicial misapplication of the law and by
refuting juror misconceptions about domestic violence that might
prevent triers of fact from viewing battered women's actions as
reasonable. ' ' m
Finally, battered women may be denied either a self-defense
instruction or expert testimony on battered woman syndrome based
upon their nonconformance with the paradigmatic battered woman or
the good battered woman stereotypes.
Therefore, women who were not allowed to present expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome or the psychological effects
of battering, or who were denied a jury instruction on self-defense,
217. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 839-40.
218. Id. at 840-41. A survey by Charles Ewing and Moss Aubrey, published in the
Journal of Family Violence, found that "most people do not understand the psychology of
battered women and domestic violence" and that "women were even more likely than men
to harbor misconceptions." Laura A. Kiernan, Battered Women Use Their Fear as a
Defense, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Oct. 16, 1988, at 1, 22. The survey asked 216 potential
jurors to respond to a hypothetical situation in order to measure public opinion as to
commonly held myths about battered women. Id.
219. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 840-41.
220. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1585.
221. Id. at 1587. For example, one study of 85 cases showed that expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome was offered in 44 cases, but admitted in only 26. Ewing, supra
note 19, at 585.
222. Developments, supra note 15, at 1578 n.22.
223. See supra part III.A.3.
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may have been wrongly convicted due to bias in the trial court, and
thus may be entitled to a justice-enhancing pardon.' 4
b. technical guilt with significant mitigating factors
The second classification where pardons are justified according
to a justice-enhancing view of the pardoning power is technical guilt
with significant mitigating factors.' This situation is most often
found when the defendant suffered from some sort of reduced ability
at the time of the crime.1 6 Although battered women who kill their
abusers do not necessarily suffer from any sort of reduced ability,
there are situations in which such mitigating circumstances are
present. 7  When such circumstances are present, the pardon of
battered women on justice-enhancing grounds is justified.
In addition to reduced ability issues, sociological and cultural
factors may also be taken into account as significant mitigating
factors.' Within this category it may be correct to evaluate past
abuse as a sociological or cultural component that should be
considered as a mitigating factor.
224. See Courtroom, supra note 1, at 841 ("[I1n many of these cases, the defendant,
even under existing law, should have been acquitted outright, but instead faces a lengthy
prison sentence because of the inability of the criminal justice system to address these
issues fairly."). This basis for pardoning is one that has been recognized by state
governors when they present justifications for the pardons of particular battered women.
See, e.g., Celeste, supra note 81. In an interview with Joan Lunden on ABC's Good
Morning America on December 26, 1990, former Ohio Governor Richard Celeste stated
that his primary criteria in granting clemency to 25 battered women who had killed their
abusers was that
All of these women had been denied the opportunity to use the fact that they
had been battered, that they experienced the battered woman syndrome, as any
part of their defense in their hearing before a judge or jury. So they were
victims before we changed our law in the state of Ohio.
Id
225. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 841.
226. See, e.g., id at 838, 841. Kathleen Moore places the situation of reduced-ability
offenders into the factual innocence classification. MOORE, supra note 83, at 138-41.
Moore states that "the judicial system is generally set up to protect [reduced-ability
offenders] from punishment. When the system malfunctions and the protection is
imperfect, the use of the pardon is an important safeguard." Id. at 141.
227. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 841. The example Professor Ridolfi uses is the case
of Jean Harris in New York. Id. After convicting Harris of second degree murder in the
death of her lover, the trial judge publicly admitted that the murder conviction was too
severe, based on the "defendant's emotional condition, a condition that was at least in part
caused by the prescription medication [her lover] had prescribed for her." Id.
228. Kobil, supra note 89, at 625 n.338.
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c. technical guilt with moral innocence
The third category in which pardons are justified on justice-
enhancing grounds is technical guilt with moral innocence. 9
Because principles of retributivist justice propose that a person's just
deserts can be determined based on their moral guilt, as well as their
legal guilt," technical guilt with moral innocence is a proper
category for the exercise of justice-enhancing pardons. The reason
this category is necessary can be expressed as follows: "If the law is
a reliable measure of human goodness, so that every crime is a moral
failing, then pardon is never justified. But the law and morality can
fail to coincide, defeating the moralistic-retributivist justification for
punishment. In such cases pardons are justified.""2
Professor Ridolfi suggests that many battered women who kill
their abusers can be considered morally innocent and thus should be
subjected to the exercise of the pardoning power. 3' There would
seem to be a combination of factors by which battered women may
be judged morally innocent, including the severity and longevity of
the abuse, the threat to unprotected loved ones, often children, and
the repeated failure of the law to provide any meaningful protec-
tion. 3 In situations involving the above elements, battered women
229. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 838-39, 841-42. Kathleen Moore also suggests that
pardons are justified on retributivist or justice-enhancing grounds in cases where a person
is "liable to punishment but not morally deserving of punishment." MOORE, supra note
83, at 95.
230. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
231. MOORE, supra note 83, at 155.
232. Courtroom, supra note 1, at 841-44.
233. Id. at 844. Professor Ridolfi uses the case of Brenda Axis as an example of a
battered woman who may be considered morally innocent. Id. at 842. As discussed in the
Introduction to this Comment, Aris was married at the age of 17 and suffered severe
physical and verbal abuse on a daily basis throughout her marriage to Rick Aris, much of
which was testified to by members of Rick's own family. Id. Her husband refused to let
her leave the house, often locking her in her room, and she had no access to a car or
telephone. Id. Finally, after a particularly severe beating and the threat that she would
not be alive until morning, Brenda Axis shot her husband while he was passed out from
a combination of drugs and alcohol. Id. Aris was denied any self-defense instruction at
her trial. Id. at 843. Professor Ridolfi states that
[t]he long abuse [Ans] suffered, the failure of the law to provide meaningful
protection, and a full understanding of Battered Woman's Syndrome-including
appreciation for the likely accuracy of Brenda's perception of danger-all suggest
that she is not morally guilty of murder in very much the same sense that the
child who accidently pushed another child into a vat of boiling water wasn't
guilty either.
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who have killed their abusers may be seen as morally innocent, if not
legally innocent, in the eyes of society.
One additional situation where technical guilt with moral
innocence is present is when the offender has already suffered enough
to atone for their crime. "In these cases, 'poetic justice' can be
said to make further punishment by society superfluous," and pardons
granted on these grounds are consistent with principles of retributive
justice. Battered women who kill may fit into this category if they
have suffered enough through all the years of beating, or if they have
already served enough time to atone for the crimes.
d. disparities in punishment and sentencing unrelated to deserts
Pardons granted due to disparities in punishment are necessary
corollaries of a retributivist theory of punishment. 6  Since the
underpinning of retributivist theory is that the just deserts for any
particular crime can be objectively determined, disparities in
sentencing among individuals who have committed the same crime
attack the validity of retributivist justice. Pardons may be granted to
battered women who have killed their abusers based on sentencing
disparities among those convicted of the same crime within the same
jurisdiction. 7
A closely related justification for pardoning is sentencing that is
unrelated to just deserts? 8 Unrelated sentencing may be based on
factors such as the race or gender of the accused, as opposed to the
actual punishment deserved. 9  Battered women who have killed
their abusers suffer from unrelated sentencing based on both of the
above factors.
Battered women who kill often receive harsher sentences than
men who murder their wives or lovers.2' This demonstrates that
Id. at 844. Governor Pete Wilson has commuted Brenda Aris's sentence from 15 years
to life to 12 years to life. Ellis, supra note 9, at A19. She will now probably serve a total
of eight and a half years for second degree murder, as the only battered woman to whom
Governor Wilson has granted clemency. Id. at Al, A19.
234. Kobil, supra note 89, at 633.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 627.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 629.
239. Id.
240. See supra note 128 (stating that the average sentence for a woman who kills her
intimate partner is 15 to 20 years, while the average sentence for a man who does the same
is two to six years).
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the sentences that battered women who kill their abusers receive are
not always based on just deserts, but may instead be based on factors
such as their gender. Such unrelated sentences justify the exercise of
executive clemency.
Battered women of color, particularly black women, who kill
their abusers may suffer a form of double jeopardy in sentencing.
Not only may they receive greater sentences based upon their gender,
but they may also receive sentences unrelated to their crimes based
upon their race.24' Such unrelated sentences are also contrary to a
retributivist theory of justice, and thus these battered women should
be attractive subjects for the exercise of executive clemency.
The fact that a particular battered woman fits into any one of the
above categories is alone enough to justify the exercise of the
pardoning power. A battered woman who fits into a combination of
the categories presents an even stronger case for a pardon.242 Thus,
many battered women would be eligible for executive pardons if
pardoning was always predicated upon the justice-enhancing rationale
of retributive justice.
3. A license to kill?
The justice-enhancing rationale for pardoning apparently justifies
pardoning battered women who kill their abusers. However, there are
serious arguments that such a use of the pardoning power creates a
license to kill.243
In People v. Aris24 the court eloquently sets forth the argument
against specialized treatment for battered women.245 The court
begins by stating, "'Any civilized system of law recognizes the
supreme v~lue of human life, and excuses or justifies its taking only
in cases of apparent absolute necessity."" The court then goes on
to say that although it
241. Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 321, 329-30 (1992); cf. TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note
30, at 206 ("The ratio of Black women to white women convicted of killing their abusive
husbands is nearly two to one.").
242. See Courtroom, supra note 1, at 843-44.
243. See, e.g., Celeste, supra note 81; Larry King Live: Clemency For Battered Women,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter Larry King].
244. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989).
245. Id. at 1187-89, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
246. Id. at 1188, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (quoting People v. Jones, 191 Cal. App. 2d 478,
482, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (1961)).
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recognize[s] that applying [a strict definition of self-defense]
is difficult because of our sympathy for the plight of a
battered woman and disgust for the batterer, it is fundamen-
tal to our concept of law that there be no discrimination
between sinner and saint solely, on moral grounds. Any less
exacting definition of imminence fails to protect every
person's right to live.247
In conclusion, the court states that the battered woman's problem
must be resolved by
other means provided by her family, friends, and society in
general such as restraining orders, shelters, and criminal
prosecution of the batterer. While these means have proved
tragically inadequate in some cases, the solution is to
improve those means, not to lessen our standards of protec-
tion against the unjustified and unexcused taking of life.24
The court in Aris presents a compelling argument against the
special treatment of battered women in the criminal justice system.
However, this argument tends to avoid discussion of the blame that
may be placed on society for the prevalence of battered women,249
as well as the various arguments supporting the fact that most
battered women cannot receive a fair trial without the admission of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.Y0
The argument against clemency for battered women takes the
above propositions a step further. A woman who has been convicted
of homicide has already had at least one chance to tell her story to a
jury of her peers. Why should she get another?
Not surprisingly, many prosecutors are opposed to clemency for
battered women.21 The prosecutor in the Aris case, Riverside
County Deputy District Attorney Barbara Hayden Marmor, believes
that "'battered women's syndrome' should not become a license to
kill, and ... women share some responsibility if they remain with
spouses who abuse them." 2 After former Ohio Governor Richard
Celeste's grant of clemency to twenty-five battered women, the head
247. 1l at 1189, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
248. Id. at 1190, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
249. See supra part III.A.1.
250. See supra part III.B.2.a.
251. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1591; Celeste, supra note 81; Ellis, supra note
9, at A19.
252. Ellis, supra note 9, at A19.
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of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association stated that battered
women do not have a license to kill, and that clemency for convicted
battered women could encourage other battered women to attempt
to kill their own abusers303
There is also a fear among prosecutors and others that women
who were not battered are attempting to use battered woman
syndrome as a fake defense.' For example, Orlando prosecutor
Dorothy Sedgwick is certain that Rita Collins was attempting to use
battered woman syndrome as a fake defense after she killed her
husband and feels sure that justice was done in denying Rita
clemency." Rita argued that she was the victim of years of
physical and mental abuse before she filed for divorce and got a
restraining order against her husband, and that he continued to abuse
her until she shot him. 6 However, prosecutors "played tapes of
[Rita] threatening her husband over the phone and portrayed her as
a bitter, unstable woman who had bought a gun, lured him to the
house and murdered him out of jealousy and anger over the di-
vorce." 7  In addition, recent investigations into the cases of the
twenty-five women former Ohio Governor Richard Celeste pardoned
raise doubts as to whether some of the women were actually battered
at all. This fear of abuse of battered woman syndrome presents
a convincing argument against clemency for battered women, yet it
does not justify excluding all battered women from the exercise of
executive clemency 
59
It has also been alleged that pardoning battered women who kill
sends the wrong message to a society that already seems to endorse
violence.2" Lawrence Sherman, professor of criminology at the
University of Maryland and president of the Crime Control Institute
of Maryland believes that
253. Id.
254. Gibbs, supra note 69, at 40.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 39-40.
257. Id. at 40.
258. Robin Yocum, Womens' Clemency Angers Prosecutors, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan.
27, 1991, at 5F.
259. In addition, the proposed clemency commission may be even better adapted than
a jury to determine whether a particular woman is "faking it." Such a commission would
be made up of professionals not as prone to sympathy as juries, and since rules of evidence
would not bar their ability to obtain information, they would have access to more
information regarding the circumstances of the case.
260. Larry King, supra note 243.
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[t]his country has an epidemic of homicide. Kids under age
10 are starting to kill each other. The rate of murder by
young people has doubled in the last five years. Any
message from somebody of the stature of the governor of
Ohio that says a whole class of killers should be forgiven
without having to do their jail time is just one more way that
society says it's OK to kill people.26'
Although Professor Sherman agreed that battered women often
deserve better treatment by the courts, he believes that once they are
convicted they should serve their time.262
Many of these arguments against granting clemency for battered
women who have killed are convincing, yet they often seem to reflect
a vision of what should be, instead of what is. They often ignore the
arguments that society is somewhat responsible for the situation of
battered women,263 and that battered women often do not receive
fair trials for various reasons.2 4 In addition, even while advocating
that battered women should turn to various alternative sources for
help, as opposed to letting the situation continue until it gets out of
hand, most critics recognize that alternatives for battered women are
woefully scarce.' The response of police and law enforcement
officials to battered women often leaves something to be desired,
21
261. Id.
262. 1l
263. See supra part III.A.1.
264. See supra part III.B.2.a.
265. Larry King, supra note 243.
266. For example, Shalanda Burt, who is currently serving 17 years in a Florida prison
for shooting her boyfriend, repeatedly faced ambivalence from police and law enforcement
officials. Gibbs, supra note 69, at 42. A week after she had her first baby, her boyfriend
raped her and ripped out the stitches, yet the police replied by giving her a card with a
deputy's name on it and telling her that it was just a "lovers quarrel." Id. Two weeks
before the shooting Shalanda threw a bottle at her boyfriend's truck following a
particularly vicious beating. Id. Her boyfriend was arrested for aggravated assault because
she was pregnant, but released on $3,000 bail, while Shalanda was arrested for assault with
a deadly missile and violently resisting arrest, and her bail was set at $10,000. Id.
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shelters are few and far between, 67 and court restraining orders are
a "makeshift shield at best, often violated and hard to enforce."2"
Perhaps a portion of the criticism of clemency for battered
women is based upon the arbitrary and capricious way it has been
exercised in the past.2 69 It is obvious why critics would object to a
pardon that was based mainly on executive whim or political
expediency. However, if the pardoning of battered women was
based solely on the justice-enhancing goals set out above,27 it is
possible that much of the current criticism will be addressed.
C. Proposed Changes in the Exercise of Executive Clemency to
Create a Principled System to Address the Needs
of Battered Women Who Kill
Since many battered women who kill their abusers should be
eligible for pardons under a justice-enhancing theory,272 what can be
done to change the procedural manner in which pardons are exercised
in order to encompass more fully these women? How do we decide
which battered women are eligible for pardons? And how do we
implement a system of pardoning in which justice is ensured?
1. Current problems with pardoning battered women
Recently, clemency movements have sprung up throughout the
country, submitting petitions to governors asking for executive
267. Lawrence Sherman admits that "[e]very shelter in this country is overwhelmed
with far more demand for their limited space than they can possibly meet, and there's no
federal funding to speak of to provide temporary shelter from the kind of threat to their
life and safety that [battered women] are facing." Larry King, supra note 243. The
appalling inadequacy of shelter facilities is illustrated by the following facts: "New York
has about 1,300 beds for a state with 18 million people .... [In] 1990 the Baltimore zoo
spent twice as much money to care for animals as the state of Maryland spent on shelters
for victims of domestic violence." Gibbs, supra note 69, at 42. In addition, the National
Domestic Violence Hotline was disconnected in July of 1992. 1l
268. Gibbs, supra note 69, at 42. For example, Patricia Kastle, an Olympic skier, was
shot by her former husband even though she had a restraining order against him. Id.
Shirley Lowery was stabbed by her former boyfriend 19 times with a butcher knife in the
corridor of the courtroom where she went to get a restraining order. Id. Finally, Lisa
Bianco was beat to death with the butt of a shotgun by her husband when he was out of
jail on an eight-hour pass. Id.
269. See infra part III.C.1.
270. See infra part III.C.1.
271. See supra part III.B.2.
272. See supra part III.B.2.
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clemency for battered women.'73 Such movements have been
successful in some states in that a considerable number of battered
women have been pardoned or have had their sentence commut-
ed. 4  However, as the history of pardoning in America exempli-
fies,275 governors often base their pardoning decisions on political
pressures, rather than justice-enhancing goals.276 The dependency
of pardoning on political tides has also created long periods where the
clemency power is rarely, if ever, exercised, followed by sudden bursts
of its use.2'
Battered woman have suffered from this "atrophy" of the
pardoning power. The few times governors have pardoned or granted
clemency to battered women, the political backlash has been
tremendous.2 8 For example, when former Ohio Governor Richard
Celeste granted clemency to twenty-five battered women who had
either killed or assaulted their abusers he was "vilified" by some and
faced a "tide of public dissatisfaction."279 One newspaper editorial
criticized Celeste's actions, calling them, "a sad and sorry perfor-
mance, an exercise of arrogance, if not outright contempt. '280
Indeed, Celeste's grants of clemency to these battered women, as well,
as to various other prisoners, prompted an unprecedented legal suit
by Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher, who attempted to invalidate
the commutations." It is also interesting to note that Celeste
granted these pardons at the close of his second term, when he was
not facing the political pressures surrounding reelection.2 Gover-
273. See Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Papenvork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 655, 657 (1991); see, e.g., Courtroom, supra note 1, at 836 (highlighting the focus
of the California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison); Geraldine Baum, Should These
Woman Have Gone Free?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at El (stating that House of Ruth,
a Baltimore battered woman's advocacy group, requested the clemencies of eight battered
women from Maryland Governor William D. Schaefer); Gary Spencer, Legislators Seek
Release of Women Prisoners, N.Y. L.., Mar. 5,1991, at 1 (noting Brooklyn Assemblywom-
an Helene E. Weinstein urged former New York Governor Cuomo to recommend pardons
for battered women in a resolution).
274. For example, 25 women were granted clemency by former Ohio Governor Richard
F. Celeste, and the sentences of eight women were commuted by Maryland Governor
William D. Schaefer. Baum, supra note 273, at El; Celeste, supra note 81.
275. See supra part II.B.2.
276. See Kobil, supra note 273, at 672.
277. Kobil, supra note 89, at 614.
278. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 273, at El.
279. Kobil, supra note 273, at 656, 658.
280. Id. at 657 n.14 (citing Killers Spared, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 14, 1991, at 8A).
281. Id. at 656.
282. See Kobil, supra note 89, at 656.
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nor William D. Schaefer of Maryland also received a "political
pounding" for his grants of clemency to eight battered women who
had either killed or assaulted their mates. Finally, when Illinois
Governor Jim Edgar granted clemency to four battered women out
of the ten petitions presented to him, it was suggested that the grants
of clemency were merely an effort to lure voters.'
The political backlash felt by these governors may prevent other
governors from granting clemency to battered women, even when
justice-enhancing purposes would be served by such grants. For
example, as of August 1994, Governor Pete Wilson of California had
commuted the sentence of only one battered woman, Brenda Axis,
out of the nineteen petitions he reviewed in 1993.'
Despite its long history in the United States, clemency should not
be utilized at the whim of political tides, but rather upon principled
standards and for justice-enhancing purposes.' 6 Clemency is vital
[d]espite [its] politically explosive nature ... [as] it is an
integral part of our system of justice, and hence governors
should exercise the power in a fair and principled manner
.... Yet owing to the potential repercussions for granting
clemency, the temptation has been, and will continue to be,
for governors to use the power infrequently, and in all
likelihood, injudiciously.
Thus, many battered women who deserve clemency, based upon
the justice-enhancing goals of the pardoning power, will be denied
due to the political pressures inherent in the exercise of that power.
In order to treat battered women with justice and equality, some
change in the structure of the pardoning power is called for in an
effort to distance it somewhat from the direct weight of political
pressure.
283. Baum, supra note 273, at El.
284. Susan Kuczka, 4 Who Killed Mates Freed; Women Abused, Edgar Says, CHI. TRIB.,
May 13, 1994, at 1, 9.
285. Ellis, supra note 9, at A19.
286. See Kobil, supra note 89. One central criticism supporters of battered women
syndrome have regarding clemency as a method of dealing with battered women is that
"clemency petitions do not require judicial proceedings. A governor has broad discretion
to grant or deny the claims; thus, such decisions tend to be completely ad hoc."
Developments, supra note 15, at 1590-91. A principled system of pardoning based on
justice-enhancing goals would address this concern.
287. Kobil, supra note 273, at 699.
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2. The proposed clemency commission
To ensure that justice-enhancing uses of the pardoning power are
kept free from political pressures' and the whim of the execu-
tive, 9 a separate clemency commission should be established that
is free from "the political pressures which inevitably distort the
decisions of elected officials. ',2' This commission would be respon-
sible solely for determining whether the use of the executive pardon
is justified under justice-enhancing rationales. "Such a board could
... be appointed during good behavior, and be selected based on
expertise in various areas relevant to assessing the fairness of the
punishment imposed.""29 The membership of the board should also
include minorities, "who traditionally have made up a large percent-
age of those incarcerated or sentenced to death,"2" and
"[r]epresentatives of the citizenry, victims of crime, and perhaps
philosophers or clerics."' Finally, "the process for selecting
members of the commission would need to be insulated from
288. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
289. See supra part III.C.1.
290. Kobil, supra note 89, at 622. As of 1977, 10 states had already vested full
clemency authority in special boards, including Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah. STAFFORD,
supra note 84, at 1. Additionally, seven other states allow the governor to grant clemency
only upon the recommendation of a special board. Id. However, the bifurcation of
justice-enhancing and justice-neutral uses of the pardoning power is not present in any of
these systems, nor do they insulate clemency decisions from political pressures, since in
many cases the ultimate decision rests with the governor alone. See id.
291. Kobil, supra note 89, at 622-23. Kobil suggests four possible sources of principled
standards to govern pardoning decisions: the legislative branch, the judicial branch, the
people themselves, and the executive branch. Id. at 614-15. However, due largely to the
separation of powers problems inherent in vesting any sort of pardoning power in
alternative branches of government, Kobil determines that "the executive branch remains
the most logical choice to pursue refinement of the clemency power." Id. at 622. Thus,
"[a] chief executive who wished to dispense clemency in a principled fashion could do so
by implementing by executive order [the proposed Clemency Commission]." Id. Of
course, the executive would still retain power to pardon, but just delegate to the
Commission the power to make justice-enhancing decisions.
292. The inclusion of minorities and women is particularly vital when dealing with
battered women who have killed. For instance, minorities are often denied the benefit of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in their trials, and thus are particularly
suitable for exercise of the pardoning power. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying
text. Additionally, since women of color often do not fit the stereotype of the battered
woman, it is particularly necessary to have other minority women on any clemency
commission to offer insight into the situations of these women. See supra notes 169-73 and
accompanying text.
293. Kobil, supra note 89, at 623.
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politicization as much as possible," and the members should be
appointed by the executive in conjunction with some other branch of
government "to ensure that the appointees do not reflect a single
political persuasion and are not beholden to a particular individual or
faction."2'
Ideally, any battered woman who has been convicted of homi-
cide-and presumably any other criminal as well-would be able to
apply to the commission for a review of their case. Although it could
be argued that such a procedure would absorb too many limited
administrative resources, at least seventeen states already operate
special commissions, or boards, which examine cases for the exercise
of executive clemency.295
The creation of such a clemency commission would benefit
battered women who have killed by providing them with the chance
to retell their story to a group more focused on justice and less
susceptible to the biases of many trial courts and juries.296 The
diverse membership of the commission would ensure that the abuse
and history of every woman is taken into account and not just those
who fit into the paradigmatic or good battered woman stereotype.2"
Finally, this commission would be able to assess the punishment
meted out to a particular battered woman and determine if it was fair
in relation to other punishments given for similar crimes.
3. Splitting justice-neutral and justice-enhancing uses of the
pardoning power will allow principled decisions to be made
regarding the pardoning of battered women who kill
A bifurcation of the clemency power between its justice-
enhancing uses and its justice-neutral uses29" is essential for a
principled consideration of the pardon petitions of battered women
294. Id. at 624.
295. STAFFORD, supra note 84, at 1. Ten states already vest full clemency authority in
special boards, while seven more provide that governors may only pardon after an
affirmative recommendation of a special board: Ik However, such boards do not operate
under the restrictions set out in this Comment.
296. See supra part III.A.1. Battered women are particularly auspicious subjects for the
exercise of the executive pardoning power, based on societal fault and unfair trials. See
supra parts III.A.1, III.B.2.a. However, there is no reason why such a pardoning board
should not be established to administer all justice-enhancing uses of the pardoning power,
regardless of the identity of the criminal. See generally Kobil, supra note 89 (arguing for
the establishment of a clemency commission to administer pardons in all situations).
297. See supra parts III.A.3.a-b.
298. Kobil, supra note 89, at 622.
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who kill. This bifurcation is essential because the two types of
exercises of the pardoning power serve two distinct purposes, as
[d]ifferent considerations underlie these two types of
clemency and they must be applied discretely, with a view to
the function each serves. Justice-enhancing acts of clemency
have a single purpose: they ensure that our penal system
operates fairly, so that each person is rendered her due.
Justice-neutral acts of clemency can serve a variety of ends,
ranging from preserving the unity of the state to advancing
the political or financial aims of those granting clemency.2'
Daniel Kobil posits the theory that the clemency process should
be split between the executive and a "professional board that is
independent of ... political pressures."3" Additionally, such a
bifurcation would serve to create the particular environment necessary
to make truly justice-enhancing decisions, unhampered by political
pressures."0
Battered women would be particularly well-served by such a
division of the two types of executive clemency. First, many executive
decisions to pardon or not to pardon battered women who have killed
are currently based upon political pressures and not on the actual
punishment the woman deserves.3" A split between the exercise of
justice-enhancing pardons and justice-neutral pardons would allow the
clemency petitions of battered women to be reviewed free from
political pressure, and thus on truly justice-enhancing grounds. Since
many battered women should be subject to pardons or clemency on
justice-enhancing grounds, 3 this bifurcation would allow for a
politically neutral consideration of justice for those women.
Additionally, battered women could still be pardoned for
principled justice-neutral reasons such as mercy.3t" Since pardons
299. Id.
300. Id. at 622-23.
301. Id. at 622.
302. See supra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
303. See supra part III.B.2.
304. See Kobil, supra note 89, at 636-37. Daniel Kobil states, "I do not believe that it
is necessary to find a justice-enhancing element in every clemency decision. Notwithstand-
ing the philosophical inconsistency that results, some justice-neutral acts of clemency are
desirable elements of our justice system." Id. But see MOORE, supra note 83, at 196, 199
(stating that "genuine mercy is out of place in the institutions of a legal system" and that
"the pardoning power is abused when a pardon is granted for any reason other than that
punishment is undeserved"). Additionally, Kobil states that "[r]etributivists [such as
Moore] believe that neither [justice-neutral nor justice-enhancing pardons] should be
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for justice-neutral reasons would remain under the exclusive control
of the executive, 05 such pardons would still be highly subject to
political pressures. However, justice-neutral pardons often play a
desirable role in our society as well.3 Specifically in the case of
battered women who kill, justice-neutral pardons may play a vital role
in pardoning women who do not fit perfectly into the categories in
which pardons are justified on justice-enhancing grounds, yet whom
the executive still feels do not deserve the punishment they received.
The fact that justice-neutral pardons are often politically
motivated will not be harmful to battered women once they are
segregated from justice-enhancing pardons because those women who
deserve clemency based on principles of retributivist justice will not
be subject to those political pressures. The bifurcation of justice-
neutral and justice-enhancing uses of the pardoning power serves to
ensure justice for those battered women who deserve it and allow
mercy for many others.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clemency, properly exercised and freed of political pres-
sures, represents a viable vehicle for remedying many of the
problems inherent in an imperfect, overloaded, and increas-
ingly rigid system of criminal justice. The extrajudicial
corrective of clemency provides a safety valve for our
criminal justice system, another opportunity for an offender
to tell her story more thoroughly, or at least differently, than
she could at trial.30 7
Male violence against women in intimate relationships is the
cause of more injuries to American women than car accidents,
muggings, and rapes combined.3 8 In fact, it is estimated that fifty
percent of all women will be abused by their husbands at some
granted unless the executive determines that the pardon will also serve a justice-enhancing
function." Kobil, supra note 89, at 636.
305. Kobil, supra note 89, at 622.
306. Id. at 636-37. "Although such pardons cannot be justified retributively, the
Framers evidently were convinced that the benefit to the nation as a whole outweighed
the potential harm which would result from these pragmatic exceptions to principles of
justice." Id. at 637.
307. Id. at 613.
308. Gibbs, supra note 69, at 41.
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time,3°9 and twenty-two to thirty-five percent of all emergency room
visits by women are the result of domestic abuse.31°
Despite such widespread abuse, a very small percentage of
battered women actually kill their abusers.3 1' And despite rampant
media images to the contrary, battered women who kill their abusers
are rarely acquitted and generally are sentenced to long prison
terms. 32 Given the prevalence and far-reaching effects of domestic
abuse in our society and the repeated failure to adequately address
the problem, either socially or judicially, executive clemency presents
a necessary and viable approach to ensure that justice is done.
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309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Developments, supra note 15, at 1574.
312. Id. at 1574-75.
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